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Abstract
This paper studies consumer search and pricing behaviour in the British domestic electricity
market following its opening to competition in 1999. We develop a sequential search model in
which an incumbent and an entrant group compete for consumers who find it costly to obtain
information on prices other than from their current supplier. We use a large data set on prices
and input costs to structurally estimate the model. Our estimates indicate that consumer search
costs must be relatively high in order to rationalize observed pricing patterns. We confront our
estimates with observed switching behaviour and find they match well.
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1 Introduction
From the consumer’s point of view, electricity is one of life’s essentials. It is also a very homogeneous
product; one company’s electricity is the same as any other’s.1 Bertrand-type economic arguments
then suggest that if supplier prices differ, all consumers flock to their cheapest. In Britain, this has
not happened, despite every consumer having had the opportunity to switch for over 10 years and
despite a higher proportion switching than in any other European country or US state (Defeuilley,
2009). In this sense, market competition has not worked well. Faced with six major suppliers
offering different prices, significant switching continues to occur but a majority of consumers still
pay over the odds and company prices still diverge considerably. Within the period and bill type we
investigate, the price range consistently exceeds 20%, but it continues beyond this. For example,
in July 2010 a consumer living in the East Midlands, anticipating use of 3300kWh of electricity a
year (a medium quantity), paying by direct debit, would pay between £289 and £494 per year.2
Why do we see such a large price range?
Our analysis of this significant price divergence focuses on search costs as a candidate expla-
nation. The resulting structural model estimates suggest that even search costs at lower quartile
are high, significant as a fraction of the bill, though falling through time. A particular novelty
of our paper is that we can independently verify the characteristics of these estimated costs using
market information on changes in supplier shares, finding an excellent match between the two. We
also investigate several other factors that are of potential importance, for example switching costs,
service quality and promotional activity.
How might search costs explain the remarkably big observed differences in prices across suppliers
of electricity? The basic approach is relatively straightforward: if some consumers have more
information on prices than others, for example, because these consumers have been shopping around
(shoppers), firms have an incentive to offer these consumers a lower price than non-shoppers. More
1This is particularly so if, as in our case, (i) each supplier’s electricity would come through the same distributor’s
wires so that suppliers do not differ amongst themselves in terms of service reliability and (ii) green electricity does
not command a premium from consumers.
2Price (i.e. annual bill) quotes retrieved online from uSwitch.com on 22 July 2010, rounded to whole £. For
comparison, the default option would result in a bill of £416 per year, so moving to the cheapest gives a 30% saving.
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efficient firms might then cater to the shoppers, while the firms with higher marginal cost serve
the non-shoppers, resulting in price dispersion. Alternatively, with more relevance for our market
situation, firms might find it optimal to randomize prices in order to balance the incentive to set a
low price to maximize surplus from shoppers against the incentive to set a high price to maximize
surplus from the non-shoppers.
We build a model that focuses on optimal price setting behaviour of an incumbent and several
entrants under the presence of costly sequential consumer search. Both the incumbent and the set
of similar entrants have an endogenous set of loyal customers, the difference being that by definition
the incumbent has a bigger set of loyal customers to start with than each of the entrants. Although
the model is tailored to the early years of the consumer electricity market in Britain, in principle it
applies to many markets that have been recently liberalized (for instance telecommunication and
gas). Our theoretical results show that in equilibrium the incumbent supplier sets its price equal
to the monopoly price, while the entrants compete by randomly drawing their prices from a price
distribution. Simulations indicate that prices are increasing in the number of consumers being
served by the entrants.
In the empirical part of our study we use the equilibrium of the theoretical search model to
structurally estimate search costs in the British electricity market. For this purpose we use a large
data set of prices collected in the period between 2002 and 2005,3 as well as information on cost side
variables. Our results indicate that even though average margins went up for most of the sampling
period, search costs have gone down over time.
The paper builds on both the theoretical and empirical literature on consumer search. Burdett
and Judd (1983) show that price dispersion can result as an equilibrium phenomenon without any
ex ante heterogeneity in a non-sequential search setting. Stahl (1989) builds a sequential search
model with homogeneous firms and a two-type distribution of search cost. Our theory model has
its origins in Stahl (1996), who allows for a continuous distribution of search cost in a sequential
search setting. As in Baye, Kovenock and De Vries (1992) and Kocas and Kiyak (2006) we assume
3The date range is deliberate, as we explain below. It lies between the final liberalization move and significant
structural changes.
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consumers do not allocate themselves equally across firms: the incumbent in our model has a bigger
share of loyal consumers to begin with, which leads to an asymmetry in pricing strategy between
the incumbent and entrants.
Related empirical papers include Hong and Shum (2006), Hortasu and Syverson (2004), and
Moraga-Gonzlez and Wildenbeest (2008). Hong and Shum (2006) show how to structurally estimate
a non-sequential search and sequential search model using only price data. Hortasu and Syverson
(2004) estimate search cost as well as the impact of vertical product differentiation in the US mutual
fund industry. Moraga-Gonzlez and Wildenbeest (2008) show how to estimate a non-sequential
search model by maximum likelihood. Giulietti et al. (2010a) demonstrate the basic features of
the market we investigate here, but focus on description rather than estimation.
There are obviously other potential explanations for price divergence between suppliers. Switch-
ing costs can explain price divergence between the incumbent supplier and others, but not the
substantial differences between different entrant suppliers. Our identifying assumption on search
costs is that the switching costs of those who switch without searching have similar distributional
characteristics to the switching costs for those who switch after searching. In addition to these,
differences in service level or branding might differentiate one provider from another, resulting in
suppliers with more favourable characteristics selling at a premium, or gaining greater share. We
examine the potential impact of these factors also, but find them of secondary importance.
If, as a result of search costs, consumer prices contain significant divergences, from each other
and from costs, why does it matter? Competition was introduced into the electricity supply market
largely in order to avoid the burden of regulation that previously existed (and exists still in many
parts of the world, given the consumer welfare impact of the market). Our results, echoing concerns
expressed more broadly in Stern (2010), suggest caution in the assumption that competition will
do the job, even if well-engineered to reduce the burden on consumers to a minimum.
In the next section we give an overview of the British electricity market and discuss the several
sources of price dispersion in the market. We develop our model in Section 3. In Section 4 we
present our estimation method, which we apply to the data on the British electricity market in
Section 5. Section 6 contains our test of the implications of our estimated switching costs for
4
switching activity against actual switching behaviour. Section 7 concludes.
2 The British electricity market
The UK was one of the first countries to liberalize its consumer electricity markets, by separating the
activities of supply and of distribution and regulating the latter. This led to a significant increase in
the number of competitors offering to supply domestic consumers4 in each of fourteen geographical
regions.5 Regional incumbents not only started competing in other regions, becoming entrants in
those regions, but US, German, French and Spanish firms have entered or have taken over existing
firms as well. Switching started in 1999 and since March 2002 all supply price regulation has
disappeared.6 The average number of suppliers in each region has decreased since then, from 11 in
the beginning of 2002 to on average 7 near the end of 2005 and the largest six consistently account
for over 99% of supplies to domestic consumers.
Table 1 gives an overview of how retail prices and margins have evolved throughout the sampling
period.7 Retail prices of electricity differ by payment method and geographical location. Consumers
can generally pay their electricity bill in three different ways: direct debit, standard credit and
prepayment, with direct debit being over 40% of the market. Table 1 as well as Figure 1(a) show
how average electricity retail prices have evolved over time for consumers who pay by direct debit.
Since all retail prices are at least two-part we focus on the charge for medium users, consuming
3,300kWh/year (hereafter called price). There is quite a bit of variation in prices, even within
regions. As shown in Table 1 the percentage difference in retail prices between the most and least
expensive suppliers is on average about 18%. Given that a medium user then spent on average
about £250 per year on electricity this means that for some consumers substantial savings can
be made by changing supplier. For instance, in June 2002 a moderate user of electricity living in
Birmingham (Midlands) could save about £41 a year by switching from the incumbent Npower
4We do not consider supply to non-domestic properties in this paper.
5The fourteen regions are: Eastern, East Midlands, London, Midlands, Merseyside & North Wales, Northern,
North West, South East, North Scotland, South Scotland, Southern, South Wales, South West, and Yorkshire. Note
that this list does not include Northern Ireland, where the whole electricity regime is substantially different.
6Regulation of high voltage transmission and of local distribution prices remains in place.
7The data is described in more detail in Appendix A.
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2002 2003 2004 2005
Retail prices
Mean 224.35 229.73 245.50 275.80
(Max − Min)/Min 18.4% 18.7% 20.7% 15.9%
Marginal cost
Distribution cost 56.97 56.58 54.16 57.25
Wholesale price 63.35 54.77 62.43 90.86
Other cost 52.47 50.79 52.15 66.75
Total 172.79 162.04 168.74 214.87
Margins
Mean 44.83 60.80 69.39 52.66
Max 66.95 80.71 92.03 75.39
Min 29.77 42.68 47.90 35.80
Max − Min 37.18 38.03 44.14 39.60
Second highest 53.32 69.91 80.02 62.41
Incumbent 66.92 80.39 90.05 69.67
Price-cost margin 29.9% 41.8% 45.6% 29.2%
Market share incumbent 65.7% 61.8% 59.6% 58.2%
Number of firms 11 8 8 7
Notes: Retail prices and costs are denoted in British pounds
and calculated for medium users (3,300kWh/year). All figures
are averages over all suppliers and regions. Averages over 2002
exclude February.
Table 1: Retail prices and margins medium user (direct debit)
to Scottish Hydro Electric (now SSE), which at that time was the least expensive supplier in the
Midlands.
We stop the analysis of price differences at the end of 2005 because after that period, the market
became somewhat different in character. By March 2006, only 4% of consumers had arranged their
electricity supplier directly through the Internet. Since then, this number has increased rapidly,
with reports that in 2009, 26 percent of consumers purchase electricity in this way. The proportion
of customers on internet only tariffs reached 12% in 2009. Accompanying this change in consumer
behavior, the suppliers have vastly increased the range of tariffs on offer. Whereas in the period we
study here, each supplier effectively had a single tariff on offer, now each has a considerable range.8
During the sample period there were large fluctuations in input fuel prices—wholesale gas prices
8In the case noted in the introduction, the website gave a listing of 74 tariffs for the consumer to choose amongst,
including the six major companies with many tariffs each and a few additional “virtual suppliers”, who have a tiny
market share.
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(a) Prices and costs (b) Margins
Figure 1: Retail prices and margins over time
decreased in 2002, were relatively flat in 2003, but were rising in 2004 and 2005—gas is the most
significant fuel, followed by coal. This is also illustrated by the cost curve plotted in Figure 1(a).
Here our measure of cost also includes the cost of distributing the electricity as well as costs related
to transmission, network losses, balancing, renewables obligation, carbon emission, metering, and
energy efficiency commitment. The large fluctuations in marginal cost make the retail price rather
uninformative about how the introduction of competition has affected pricing in the retail electricity
market. Figure 1(b), however, shows how the average margin has evolved over time for direct debit
consumers. Apart from the sharp drop in 2005, which is likely caused by a sudden increase in fuel
input prices, margins have been increasing during most of the sample period.9
There are several explanations for the observed differences in retail prices across electricity
providers. One explanation is that although electricity is a homogenous product, consumers might
value provider characteristics in different ways. For example, some suppliers might be offering more
service than others, or might have a more favourable brand image than other suppliers, resulting
in higher prices. To test for this we regress prices on a constant and a set of provider dummies.
To control for regional differences we include regional dummies. Moreover, we add time dummies
to control for differences over time. The resulting R2 value indicates that around 5% of variation
in prices can be explained by firm, time and regional fixed effects.10 This means that although
9A fuller analysis of the development of average retail margins over time is contained in Giulietti et al. (2010b).
10Detailed results are available on request.
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some of the variation in price is probably due to firm heterogeneity, still a substantial 95% of the
variation cannot be explained by supplier differences or differences in market characteristics across
regions and over time.
An additional explanation for the price dispersion we observe in the data is that it is costly
for consumers to switch. If consumers face a switching cost when changing suppliers a rational
consumer will switch to another provider only if the gains from switching more than offset the cost
of switching. Providers can increase the benefits of switching by setting lower prices. However, this
can provide a reason for the incumbent firm (particularly in early stages) charging higher prices
than entrants but provides no reason for prices to differ across entrant firms. As Figure 2 below
shows, there are very substantial, but changing, differences across entrant suppliers.
Part of this unexplained variation might be due to search frictions. As shown by a large
number of theoretical papers (e.g., Varian, 1980; Burdett and Judd, 1983; Stahl, 1989; Baye and
Morgan, 2001; and Janssen and Moraga-Gonzlez, 2004), price dispersion can result as an equilibrium
outcome, even in markets with homogenous firms. If some consumers search more than others, firms
have incentives to either set a high price, and maximize surplus from consumers who do not search
that much, or to set a low price in order to maximize surplus from price comparing consumers.
As a result it might be optimal for firms to start randomizing prices, with price dispersion as a
result. Consumers in Britain who plan to change electricity provider have on average six major
options. Since prices are in general not similar across the available providers, consumers first have
to (decide how much to) gather information on prices before making a decision to which supplier
to switch. This information gathering can go through several channels. For example, a consumer
could talk with a sales person, phone a company or visit the website of an electricity provider or
could go to one of the many price comparison sites around. Collecting information on prices will
be time consuming, and as such it can be considered to be costly for consumers. Consumers differ
in their in their opportunity cost of time and search method, which will create the heterogeneity on
the consumer side needed to make firms willing to charge different prices.11 As mentioned above,
11In some markets, price advertising would significantly reduce consumer search costs. In this case, as is shown in
Appendix D, there is rather little advertising in this market. Moreover, because different consumers have different
consumption levels, the price message is not (in principle or in practice) easy to target and firms rely on generalities
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in a typical search model with homogenous firms the equilibrium is in mixed strategies. In fact, in
our sample, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that price movements are consistent with a
mixed strategy equilibrium; see Appendix C.
Figure 2: Pricing patterns Eastern region
An important difference between search and switching cost is that search costs are generally
made upfront, while switching cost only arises when a consumer actually switches. For instance, by
adding switching costs into a search model for differentiated products, Wilson (2009) shows that
search costs lead to consistently larger anticompetitive effects than an equivalent level of switching
costs. Although it is difficult to distinguish switching costs from search costs empirically, because
we know that a significant proportion of consumers report as switching without searching we can
attempt to distinguish between the two.
In the next section we build a model that takes search frictions as an important determinant in
price setting behaviour of electricity providers. In addition the model makes a distinction between
optimal behaviour of the incumbent and of the entrants to the market. Before liberalization of the
market in 1999, each regional market was a local monopoly. Each of the incumbents by definition
had a large number of loyal consumers when the market opened up, which made it costly for the
incumbent to lower prices enough to prevent consumers from moving to one of the entrants.12
Entrants, on the other hand, did not have any loyal consumers to start with, so faced zero cost in
setting margins at least as low to cover search costs. Therefore, in each market one would expect
such as “low prices” and “excellent service”.
12In the period under discussion, price discrimination between old and new customers was ruled out by the regulator.
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the prices initially set by entrants to be much lower than the price set by the incumbent. Over time
lower prices at the entrants will induce consumers to switch from the incumbent to the entrants.
As a result it becomes more costly for the entrants to set very competitive prices, while at the
same time it will be more costly for an incumbent to set a very high price, so one would expect the
prices of the incumbent to be higher initially, but to converge over time to those of the entrants.
In our data this indeed seems to be the case. Figure 1 illustrates that while in the first half of the
sampling period the incumbent always has the highest price, in the second half of the sample it is
no longer the case that the incumbent is always the highest priced supplier of electricity. Figure 2
gives a similar pattern for the Eastern region. Our model developed in the next section will have
this asymmetry as an important element in explaining price patterns across electricity providers.
3 The Model
Our model is a unit demand version of Stahl (1996) with asymmetric firms selling a homogenous
good. We introduce asymmetry on the supply side of the market by modeling the strategic inter-
action of one incumbent firm and a set of N symmetric entrants. More specifically, we assume a
mass of consumers normalized to one inelastically demands at most one unit of electricity.13 At
the beginning of a period each consumer is local to one electricity provider. Assume the incum-
bent provider has a share of λ consumers, whereas all the entrants together have 1− λ consumers.
Throughout the analysis we assume the incumbent has more local consumers than each of the
entrants, i.e., λ > (1− λ)/N . Consumers’ maximum willingness to pay is equal to v. The common
marginal cost of the providers is denoted by r.
At the beginning of a period consumers only observe the price of the provider that provided them
with electricity in the previous period. To obtain additional price quotations consumers have to
engage in costly search. We assume consumer search sequentially for additional price information,
that is, consumers determine after each search whether to obtain an additional price quotation or
not. Furthermore, let the consumers be characterized by a search cost c which is drawn at the
beginning of a period from some search cost distribution G(c), with density g(c) > 0.
13We are assuming consumption does not vary in the short run as a result of the price differences experienced.
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At the beginning of the period each provider sets a price taking consumer search and switching
behavior as well as pricing strategies of the other firms as given. Let the distribution of prices
set by the entrants be denoted by F (p), with support between and p and p. As shown by Stahl
(1996) for the case of symmetric firms, if there is an (arbitrary small) atom of shoppers there are
no pure-strategy symmetric Nash Equilibria. Moreover, for the equilibrium price distribution to be
a symmetric Nash equilibrium it needs to be atomless.
First consider optimal consumer search behavior. Let H(pˆ) be the gains from searching after a
consumer has observed a price pˆ, i.e.,
H(pˆ, F ) =
∫ pˆ
p
(pˆ− p)f(p)dp =
∫ pˆ
p
F (p)dp.
The reservation price ρ(c;F ) of a consumer is defined as the price at which the gains from searching
one more time are equal to the cost of searching one more time, that is, ρ(c;F ) is the solution to
H(ρ;F )− c = 0. (1)
A consumer will continue searching as long as observed prices are higher than its reservation price
ρ(c, F ). If the consumer finds a firm that has set a lower price than her reservation value, she will
stop searching and switch to that firm.
We now move on to the price setting behavior of the firms. Assume for the moment the
incumbent firm sets a price equal to the consumers’ valuation v.14 The entrants draw their price
each period from some price distribution F (p), with support between p and p. Firms cannot or are
not allowed to price discriminate between consumers. An entrant setting a price p serves only those
of its own local consumers (1− λ)/N that have a reservation value higher than p, so the group of
own locals accepting the current price is
1− λ
N
(1−G(H(p))).
To attract consumers from the other entrants, the entrant should have a price lower than the
reservation price ρ of a consumer that visits the entrant’s supplier. Such a consumer will only
14In Appendix B we show that this is indeed optimal for the incumbent.
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start searching if her reservation price is lower than the price being set by her local supplier, which
happens with probability 1 − F (ρ). Conditionally on searching, this consumer might visit the
entrant’s supplier at her first search, second search, third search, and so on, so the probability of
selling to such a consumer is given by
∑N−1
k=1 (1 − F (ρ(c, F )))k, where k is the number of visits.
Summing up over all consumers that have a reservation value higher than p, but lower than the
maximum price charged by the entrants, p, and multiplying by the sampling probability (1−λ)/N
gives
1− λ
N
∫ H(p)
H(p)
N−1∑
k=1
(1− F (ρ(c, F )))kg(c)dc.
Since consumers served by the incumbent will only switch if the expected gains from switching
are bigger than zero, i.e., v − E[p] − c > 0, where E[p] is the expected price at the entrants, the
expected number of switchers from the incumbent is given by
λ
N
∫ v−E[p]
H(p)
N∑
k=1
(1− F (ρ(c, F )))k−1g(c)dc.
Notice that compared to the previous expression, the sampling probability is now λ/N , that because
a consumer that is local to the incumbent firm faces N entrants there might be consumers that
search N times, and that if a consumer searches only once the probability that the entrant serves
this consumer is 1.
Finally, the entrant serves the consumers with a reservation price lower than p only if it has the
lowest price among all entrants, which happens with a probability of (1− F (p))N−1, so this group
of consumers is expected to be
G(H(p))(1− F (p))N−1.
This information can be summarized in the following profit equation, i.e., the profit of each entrant
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is given by
piE(p) = (p− r)
[
1− λ
N
(1−G(H(p)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
locals accepting current price
+
1− λ
N
∫ H(p)
H(p)
N−1∑
k=1
(1− F (ρ(c, F )))kg(c)dc︸ ︷︷ ︸
switchers from other entrants
+
λ
N
∫ v−E[p]
H(p)
N∑
k=1
(1− F (ρ(c, F )))k−1g(c)dc︸ ︷︷ ︸
switchers from incumbent
+ G(H(p))(1− F (p))N−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumers with lower ρ if lowest price
]
.
This equation can be simplified to
piE(p) = (p−r)
[
1
N
∫ ∞
H(p)
N∑
k=1
(1− F (ρ(c)))k−1g(c)dc− λ
N
[1−G(H(v))] +G(H(p))(1− F (p))N−1
]
.
(2)
If there is no incumbent firm, i.e., if λ = 0, the profit equation simplifies to Stahl (1996) with unit
demand. With an incumbent firm, part of the λ consumers are locked in at the incumbent firm and
will never switch to one of the entrants. Each period the entrants make random draws from the
price distribution F (p), so even though consumers can be locked in at one of the entrants as well,
in expected terms business from these locked in consumers are offset by the decreased probability
of attracting consumers from the competing entrants. Therefore, the share of locked in consumers
at a given entrant will not have an impact on the expected profits of this entrant.15
The upper bound of the price distribution of the entrants F (p) is denoted p, where p is the
minimum of the monopoly price and the maximum a switcher is ever willing to pay, i.e., p =
min{pm, v}. The monopoly price pm can be found by taking the first order condition of the profits
at the upper bound
piE(pm) = (pm − r)
[
1
N
[1−G(H(pm))]− λ
N
[1−G(H(v))]
]
with respect to pm, which gives
pm =
[1−G(H(pm))]− λ[1−G(H(v)]
g(H(pm))
+ r.
15In fact, the common assumption in the search literature that the first observation is for free leads to exactly the
same random assignment of consumers across firms.
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An entrant will charge at most a price equal to p. Setting such a price gives a profit
piE(p) = (p− r)
[
1
N
[1−G(H(p))]− λ
N
[1−G(H(v))]
]
. (3)
In a mixed strategy equilibrium, the entrants should be indifferent between charging any price in
the support of F (p), which implies piE(p) = piE(p). This indifference condition implicitly defines
the entrants’ equilibrium price distribution F (p), i.e., for each p in the support of F (p), F (p) should
solve
(p− r)
[∫ ∞
H(p)
N∑
k=1
(1− F (ρ(c)))k−1g(c)dc− λ[1−G(H(v))] +NG(H(p))(1− F (p))N−1
]
=
(p− r)
[
[1−G(H(p))]− λ[1−G(H(v))]
]
. (4)
Now consider optimal behavior of the incumbent. Since the incumbent only sells to her own
local consumers that have a reservation price higher than the gains from searching at a price v, the
profits of the incumbent are
piI = (v − r)
[
λ[1−G(H(v))]]. (5)
Since no consumers are willing to buy for a price that is higher than their valuation, it can never
be optimal for the incumbent to set a price p > v. To see if, given the prices set by the entrants,
it is also not optimal to set a price p < v we compare equation (5) to the profits that can be made
at any other price p < v, i.e.,
piI(p) = (p−r)
[
λ(1−G(H(p)) + 1− λ
N + 1
∫ H(p)
H(p)
N∑
k=1
(1− F (ρ(c, F )))kg(c)dc+G(H(p))(1− F (p))N
]
.
(6)
In Appendix B we show that it is indeed optimal for the incumbent to set its price equal to v.
Equation (6) shows the tradeoff the incumbent faces: set a high price to maximize surplus from the
relatively large number of loyal customers it has, but face the risk that consumers with low enough
search cost will switch to one of the entrants, or set a more modest price to prevent consumers
from leaving the firm at the cost of making less money per consumer.
Illustration
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As an illustration we have drawn the entrants’ equilibrium price distribution for several values
of λ, N , and parameters of the search cost distribution in Figure 3. In the examples there is one
incumbent, valuation v = 100, and marginal cost r = 50. A λ equal to one means that all consumers
are being served by the incumbent. As a benchmark case we also give the equilibrium distribution
for λ equal to zero, which means that there is no incumbent.
(a) N = 5, G(c) = lognormal(1, 4) (b) N = 15, G(c) = lognormal(1, 4)
(c) N = 5, G(c) = lognormal(1, 6) (d) N = 5, G(c) = lognormal(4, 4)
Figure 3: Price CDF of the entrants for several values of λ
All panels of Figure 3 show that a higher share of consumers at the incumbent λ results in lower
prices being charged by the entrants. This is in line with intuition since a higher λ means fewer
loyal consumers, and therefore more incentives to price aggressively in order to make consumers
switch from the incumbent to one of the entrants. A comparison of Figures 3(a) and 3(b) illustrates
that for a lognormal distribution with parameters µ = 1 and σ = 4, an increase in the number
of entrants leads to lower prices, although at the same time the entrants put more mass on the
15
upper bound of the price distribution. The intuition for the latter is that it becomes increasingly
difficult to attract the consumers with relatively low search costs as the number of firms increases.
Firms start putting more mass on high prices to maximize surplus from consumers with relatively
high search costs.16 At the same time competition between the entrants will result in overall lower
prices. Only when λ is zero prices go up as a result of more firms, but that is because in the absence
of an incumbent it can never be optimal to set the upper bound of the price distribution lower than
v. Finally, Figures 3(c) and 3(d) show that both more dispersed search cost as well as higher mean
search costs lead to higher prices being charged by the entrants.
4 Estimation
In this section we show how to estimate the model using nonlinear least squares. Equation (4)
provides the equilibrium condition for the entrants in the model and as such it provides a start-
ing point for the estimation of the model. Unfortunately this equation only implicitly defines the
equilibrium distribution of prices F (p). Moreover, the integral makes it difficult to compute the
equilibrium, since this requires the evaluation of the price distribution at reservation prices corre-
sponding to each search cost value over which we integrate. As we will show below in more detail,
to deal with this we make use of the notion that the model only identifies points on the search
cost distribution that correspond to search cost values for which the reservations price is equal to
an observed price. This implies that for the calculation of the integral we can simply sum up the
integrand over exactly those points of support of the search cost distribution that are identified.
Assume that we observe M price of the entrants, and that these prices are ordered by in-
creasing price, i.e., p1 < p2 < · · · < pM . Let F˜ (p) be the empirical price distribution, i.e.,
F˜ (p) = (1/M)
∑M
i=1 1(pi < p). The upper bound p of F˜ (p) is given by p = pM . Inspection of
equation (2) reveals that there is a one-to-one mapping from prices to search costs via the reser-
vation prices. This can be used in the following way. Let ci be the search cost of a consumer
with reservation value ρ(ci, F ) and let this reservation value be equal to an observed price pi. This
means that the gains from searching at price pi are H(pi, F ) = ci and that ci can be calculated
16See Moraga-Gonza´lez and Janssen (2004) for a similar result for a non-sequential search model.
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directly from the data using the empirical price distribution, i.e.,
ci =
1
M
i∑
k=1
(pi − pk). (7)
In addition, it follows from the definition of the empirical price distribution that F˜ (p) = F˜ (pj) ∀ p ∈
(pj , pj+1), so for each c between H(pj) and H(pj+1) we have F˜ (ρ) = F˜ (pj). This means we can
rewrite the integral in equation (4) as
M∑
j=i
∫ H(pj+1;F˜ )
H(pj ;F˜ )
N−1∑
k=0
[1− F˜ (pj)]kg(c)dc =
M∑
j=i
N−1∑
k=0
[1− F˜ (pj)]kG(c)
∣∣∣H(pj+1)
H(pj)
=
M∑
j=i
γj
N−1∑
k=0
[1− F˜ (pj)]k,
where γj = G(H(pj+1)) − G(H(pj)), and γM = G(v − E[p]) − G(H(pM )). Denoting γM+1 =
1−G(v − E[p]), we can rewrite the equilibrium condition as
(pi−r)
[
1
N
M∑
j=i
γj
N∑
k=1
(1−F˜ (pj))k−1+1− λ
N
γM+1+
1−M+1∑
j=i
γj
 (1−F˜ (pi))N−1] = (p−r) [ 1
N
γM +
1− λ
N
γM+1
]
.
(8)
According to the equilibrium defined in the previous section, equation (8) should hold for all prices
in the support of F˜ (p), so given F˜ (p), N , r, λ, and p¯, our goal is to find γ1, γ2, . . . , γM+1 such that
this equation holds.
(a) Search cost CDF (b) Price CDF
Figure 4: Identification
Figure 4 illustrates the identification for a market with search costs drawn from a log-normal
distribution with parameters 1 and 4, the number of firms N = 5, valuation v = 100, marginal cost
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r = 50, and the share of consumers being served by the incumbent λ = 0.25. Figure 4(b) gives the
equilibrium price distribution for these parameters, as well the empirical price CDF for five draws
from the equilibrium price distribution. Figure 4(a) gives the search cost CDF as well as the search
cost values corresponding to the five draws from the equilibrium price distribution. These search
cost values are determined by equation (7) and each of them represents a search cost such that
one of the observed prices in Figure 4(b) is equal to the corresponding reservation price. The γ’s
are calculated as the difference between two subsequent evaluations of the search cost CDF at the
critical search cost values.17
To see how the search cost distribution G(c) can be identified using available data assume G(c)
is distributed according to some distribution G(c; θ) with parameter θ. Using the calculated ci’s
from equation (7) this allows us to calculate all γj ’s. Next we solve equation (8) for pi using the
empirical price distribution F˜ (pi), i.e.,
p˜i = (p−r)
1
N γM +
1−λ
N γM+1
1
N
∑M
j=i γj
∑N
k=1(1− F˜ (pj))k−1 + 1−λN γM+1 +
(
1−∑M+1j=i γj) (1− F˜ (pi))N−1 +r. (9)
We then pick θ in such a way that the difference between the calculated p˜ and the observed p is
minimal. This can be done using nonlinear least squares.
The estimation can be done parametrically by starting from a parameterized distribution of
search costs. To be able to do so, we need to have prices p, as well as the empirical price distribution
F˜ (p), the number of entrants N , unit cost r, the share of consumers at the incumbent λ, and the
maximum observed price p¯. Prices are observed, just as the number of entrants, so we can use that
to obtain the empirical price distribution. We observe the share of consumers at the incumbent for
at least some periods. Furthermore, using data we have collected on input costs, we are able to
derive a reasonable approximation of unit cost. Given that according to our model the incumbent
will always find it optimal to set its price equal to the valuation of consumers, we can obtain an
estimate of the valuation v by simply taking the price of the incumbent. The expected price can
be estimated by the mean of the observed prices.
17Note that the number of points identified on the search cost distribution is equal to the number of price obser-
vations. This means the identification of this sequential search model does not suffer from the same identification
problems as reported by Moraga-Gonza´lez, Sa´ndor, and Wildenbeest (2010) for the non-sequential search model.
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Once we have estimated the critical search cost values ci from observed prices using equation
(7), given the parameter values of the parameterized search cost distribution we can calculate γi(θ)
and use equation (9) to calculate p˜i. By minimizing the distances between the calculated prices p˜i
and corresponding observed price pi we obtain a parametric estimate of the search cost distribution.
This can be done using nonlinear least squares.
5 Estimation results
For our empirical analysis we assume the static equilibrium of the theoretical model described
in Section 3 is also the equilibrium of the repeated game with finite horizon. As long as the
fundamentals of the model do not change, this allows us to estimate the model by taking several
periods together. Because unobserved market characteristics might be different across regions we
estimate the model for each different region separately.
For each of the fourteen regions we have estimated the mean and the variance of the natural
logarithm of the search costs using the lognormal distribution as our parametric specification. To
allow for the mean and variance to vary over time we have included two trend parameters. The
estimation results are presented in Table 2 (see p.21). A first observation is that the model explains
the data very well: between 94 and 98 percent of the variation in prices can be explained by the
model and all estimated parameters are highly significant. Notice that here is substantial variation
between the regions in terms of mean log search costs and the variance of the log search costs,
with the mean ranging from 5.3 to 8.7 and the variance from 6.8 to 15.6. All estimated trend
parameters are smaller than zero, which means that average search costs within the population has
been decreasing over time. Moreover, search costs became less dispersed over time.
In Figure 5 we plot the estimated search cost distributions for all years between 2002 and
2005 for the Midlands region. According to the model consumers will only start searching if the
expected gains, given by valuation v minus the expected price E[p], are larger than search cost
c. This puts an upper bound on the part of the search cost distribution we can identify: search
cost cannot be identified beyond c = v − E[p]. In Table 2 we have put the values of c for all
regions—for the Midlands this means we can only identify search costs up to £42.16. Apparent
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Figure 5: Estimated search cost CDF Midlands region
from inspection of the curves is that search costs have to be relatively high to rationalize observed
prices. In fact, according to our estimates most consumers have search cost that are so high that
it is not worthwhile to start searching at all. The relatively high margins we found by comparing
observed prices with our measure of marginal cost already gave some indication that firms have a
lot of market power, and this can only be rationalized by our model if consumers have relatively
high search costs.
A striking finding is that our estimates suggest that there has been a leftward shift in the
search cost distribution over time. Figure 5 shows this for the Midlands, but as indicated by the
significant negative trend parameters in Table 2 other regions show the same pattern. As measured
by the lower quartile, in the Midlands search costs have gone down from £46.88 in 2002 to £19.17
in 2005. Also in other regions search costs have gone down substantially—Table 2 shows that for
most regions lower quartile search costs in 2005 are around one-quarter of what they were in 2002.
An explanation could be the increased use of price comparison sites over time. Since these sites
make searching for the provider with the lowest price a lot easier, this might explain the substantial
decrease in search costs.
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Our estimates suggest that there has been a significant leftward shift in the search cost distri-
bution over time. Figure shows this for the Midlands, but as indicated by the significant negative
trend parameters in Table 2 other regions show the same pattern. As measured by the lower quar-
tile, in the Midlands search costs have gone down from £46.88 in 2002 to £19.17 in 2005. Also in
other regions search costs have gone down substantially—Table 2 shows that for most regions lower
quartile search costs in 2005 are around one-quarter of what they were in 2002. One explanation
could be the increased use of price comparison sites over time. Since these sites make searching
for the provider with the lowest price a lot easier, this might explain the substantial decrease in
search costs. Our estimates also suggest that there are substantial differences in search costs across
regions.
6 Independent verification of search costs
One issue that faces modellers attempting to estimate the size of search costs largely through the
distribution of observed prices is verification of whether the estimates are reasonable. In our present
context, this issue is brought sharply into relief. Our estimates (Table 2) indicate what may appear
to be very high lower quartile values for search cost. At the same time, it must be presumed that
substantial search has been taking place in the market, because there is a considerable degree of
switching between electricity providers. Can these two findings be reconciled? Another potentially
questionable finding is the very significant estimated reduction in these search costs over a rather
short period of time.
To examine these questions, we make use of a source of data, independent of those previously
used in estimation, to confront our estimates. This is information on the degree of switching that
has actually taken place. We have available two pieces of statistical information from OFGEM/
DECC, one being the total number of switches per year (unfortunately not broken down by region),
the other the market share of the incumbent supplier by region. We use the latter.
Before turning to our calculations, two preliminary points need to be made. First, switching
involves costs that are conceptually different from search costs. However, in a report based on a very
extensive consumer survey for OFGEM in June 2005, Accent (2005) reported substantial findings
22
on the market, as perceived by consumer respondents to their survey. One finding is that over 80%
of electricity customers had, by then, been approached by sales people (most by a “cold-call” visit
to the home). The tactics used by these sales people, influenced by their remuneration structure,
involve them attempting to sign customers up to switch at the time of their visit. Almost 30% of
consumers were first prompted to switch supplier by contact with a sales person, according to the
survey respondents. Most remarkably, 30% of those who had switched supplier admitted never to
have tried to compare suppliers’ prices! We draw two conclusions from this. One is that switching
does not necessarily involve search, contrary to what might be thought. The second is that the
alternative methods of switching supplier are, essentially, acting of one’s own volition in searching
and selecting a new supplier, and alternatively, responding to a sales person’s invitation to switch.
These two methods of switching supplier differ in that the first incurs search costs, whilst both
incur switching costs. Responding positively to a sales person’s invitation can be modelled as
switching essentially at random to another (entrant) supplier. Searching then switching is likely to
yield a much superior tariff. The simplest way to measure this difference is as the whole benefit of
the difference between the mean tariff and the lowest available tariff, in the relevant area. As an
alternative, we also evaluate results based on the difference being between the mean tariff and the
second lowest available tariff. It is these values that we alternately use as a measure of the benefit
of switching.
The second point to make is that this calculation is still an approximation—we work with the
most popular tariff (Direct Debit, Electricity only) but we take its value at the mean consumption
level and we ignore what happens with other tariff types (although they are likely to be highly
correlated). The exercise is not exact.
Conceptually, our calculations amount to the following. Take the estimated CDFs as illustrated
by those in Figure 5. Using the particular values suggested by the methods above for search costs
(the X axis), generate the implied proportion of consumers switching by reading off the Y axis.
Confront this proportion with actual numbers switching.
These calculations are reported on in Table 3, culminating (through weighting by market sizes in
the respective areas) in estimates of the actual number of predicted switchers through these means.
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Region Predicted Incumbent’s % share
(DECC) Actual
% stay rank Dec-05 rank
eastern 38 10 40 11
emid 28 13 41 9
lond 45 6 47 5
mid 39 9 43 8
manweb 46 5 47 5
northern 17 14 39 12
norweb 33 11 28 14
seeboard 49 3 46 7
schydro 68 1 75 1
scpower 50 2 59 3
southern 48 4 59 3
swalec 44 7 65 2
sweb 42 8 41 9
yorks 29 12 35 13
average 41 46
rank correlation 0.835
Table 3: Predicted and actual shares of direct debit customers for incumbent based on years 2002-
2005
Several positive features of these results are worth drawing out. First, taking the largest possible
expected gain from search, namely the difference between mean entrant price and lowest entrant
price, leads to estimates roughly in accord with actual total switches. Specifically, the estimates
for the years 2002 to 2005 yield values between 75% and 125% of the true value. The alternative
estimates, with the lower calculated gain, lead to estimates between 55% and 90% of the actual
switches. Taking into account that around 30% of switches involved no search, this latter set of
figures is broadly in line with what may be expected. What has not happened is that our estimates
of the size of search costs compared to the available savings led to absurdly low predicted levels of
switching compared with actuality.
A second positive feature is that our estimates, of significantly falling search costs over time,
do not look outrageous either. The estimates of switcher proportions in 2005 as against earlier
years are not too different, on either measure. 2004 if anything is the outlier in our estimates. This
arises mainly because the benefits of search fall off in 2005, whereas for various reasons they are
unusually high in 2004.
A third positive feature is that we are able to predict the broad pattern across regions in terms
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of keenness to search and switch. Aggregating across all four years, but doing so separately by
area, then comparing the ranks of our predicted search and switching propensity with shares lost
across areas by the incumbent by June 2005, shows a high rank correlation, significant at 1% level.
Those areas where we predict more customers will remain with the incumbent do indeed have more
retained incumbent customers. We are able to predict the small loss in the Scottish areas, notably,
in the Scottish Power area, which is resultant from relatively small calculated savings, for example.
Of course, as we discussed in Section 2, other factors will be important in determining incumbent
losses, for example supplier reputation, and here the clear outlier is SSE, with a consistently lower
complaint level (and higher retained share—see Scottish Hydro, Southern and SWALEC areas,
which are those where it is the incumbent) than the other five. However, it is remarkable how
much can be explained based solely upon our search model.
In sum, we suggest that this calibration exercise on actual switching behaviour is significant
independent verification of our estimates of search costs, as estimated from the price distributions.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we studied the British electricity market. In the late nineties the British electricity
market was one of the first to completely open up for competition, leading to a substantial inflow
of new suppliers. Moreover, a greater proportion of consumers has switched than in any other
European country. As such it provides an interesting case of how competition has affected pricing
strategies of both the incumbent supplier of electricity as well as those of entrants. On the consumer
side of the market the inflow of new suppliers has led to changes as well, because since the opening
of the market consumers have the opportunity to look for better deals and eventually switch.
To capture the important elements of Britain’s electricity market we developed a sequential
search model that distinguishes between an incumbent and a group of entrants. Using the structure
of the model we have estimated a search cost distribution. Estimates indicate that in order for
the model to rationalize observed price patterns, search costs have to be relatively high, implying
that most consumers do not search or switch. Our estimates do indicate that search costs have
decreased over time.
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Taking the implications of the estimates of search costs for the amount of switching that should
have been observed, together with the actual amount of switching behaviour that occurred, shows
a substantial correlation between the two, which leads us to greater confidence that our search
cost estimates, which might be thought to be high, are indeed borne out in consumer switching
behaviour. More recently, the tariff structure has become more complex, rendering consumer
decisions more difficult, at the same time as some consumers’ search costs have fallen, other things
equal, as a result of using Internet search engines. In consequence, substantial differences across
tariffs remain, indeed may have become greater still.
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Appendices
A The Data
The analysis of search costs in the British electricity market is based on data from a variety of
public and commercial sources, in one case proprietary.
1. The domestic retail annual bills for electricity consumers and the names of different
suppliers serving each region (incumbents and entrants) were collected from the consumer
watchdog’s ‘energywatch’ website for the time period between April 2001, when the final
price controls on direct debit prices were removed, and December 2005 inclusive. The data
have been collected on a bi-monthly basis for consumers using the direct debit payment
method and using a medium amount of electricity (3300 kWh) in a year, for all suppliers
in each of the fourteen regions across which prices differ. The fourteen electricity regions in
Great Britain are: Eastern, East Midlands, London, Midlands, Merseyside and North Wales,
Northern, North West, South East, North Scotland, South Scotland, Southern, South Wales,
South West and Yorkshire. The final bill figures include VAT at a 5% rate. Our data excludes
Internet only tariffs since these represented only a small proportion of the subscribed tariffs
even by the end of our period.
2. The cost information used to calculate suppliers’ margins comes from a variety of sources
to account for the main cost components affecting final consumers’ bills, given the lack of
access to commercial information about suppliers’ costs. To capture the effect of wholesale
electricity prices on domestic bills we used set of proprietary wholesale data kindly supplied
by Platts, one of the three major energy data information companies. Given that all energy
suppliers have a portfolio of forward contracts for delivery at various time horizons, we used
the year-ahead price as our measure of electricity wholesale costs. These prices are determined
at a national level so this variable has no geographical differentiation but only time variation
at bimonthly frequency, in line with the frequency of observations for domestic bills.
Transmission costs vary by point of entry (generation plant) and exit (distribution point for
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delivery to final consumers) so that in order to calculate approximate values of transmission
costs at a regional level a series of assumption about flows of power across different parts
of the country and the percentage of electricity subject to the transmission charge were
required. Average values of nation-wide transmission costs were obtained from Cornwall
Energy Associates. To these aggregate values we applied weights for the different electricity
regions. These weights have been calculated on the basis of information provided by company
managing electricity transmission in the UK, National Grid (based on power flows in 2006).
Distribution costs, i.e. the costs of transmitting low voltage electricity at the regional level,
on the other hand, are subject to price regulation for each region set by the energy regulator
OFGEM. We have obtained data on distribution costs (both fixed and unit rate) for each
of the 14 regions, from the UK Department of Energy (currently designated as DECC and
formerly from BERR and DTI) over the entire period 2002-2005.
Estimates relating to other costs faced by energy suppliers (balancing costs, network losses,
metering costs, supplier costs to serve and environment related levies such as renewable
obligations, energy efficiency commitment)18 are based on the Cornwall Energy Associates
report on energy costs to consumers, which covers the years 2003 and 2006.
3. On the demand side, our analysis relied on information on the incumbents’ market share of
domestic direct debit consumers for each region over the whole time period considered, which
are published on a quarterly basis by the UK Department of energy (DECC). The number
of electricity users (consumers) for each region was based on the number of metering points
(meter point administration numbers or MPANs) published by Ofgem as meters in existence
at September 2005. The total number of switchers at the national level for each of the
years in our analysis was obtained from Ofgem’s (approximately) annual Domestic Retail
Market Reports from 2003 to 2006.
Data on advertising expenditure by the ‘big 6’ energy suppliers were obtained from the
NMR digest for the years between 1999 and 2005.
18Charges for carbon emissions were introduced in April 2005.
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Data on proportion of consumers using the Internet was obtained from OFGEM reports
(2008, 2010).
B Derivation optimal upper bound incumbent
Start from a situation where the incumbent has as many loyal customers as each of the entrants,
i.e., λ = (1− λ)/N , so that it is optimal for the entrant to set p = v. Incumbent’s profit at v is
piI(v) = (v − r)
[
λ[1−G(Φ)]] = (v − r) [1− λ
N
[1−G(Φ)]
]
> piE(p).
We know that the entrants are indifferent between charging any price in the support of F (p). When
λ = (1− λ)/N profits of the incumbent for p < p are
piI(p) = (p−r)
[
1− λ
λ
(1−G(H(p)) + 1− λ
N + 1
∫ H(p)
H(p)
N∑
k=1
(1− F (ρ(c, F )))kg(c)dc+G(H(p))(1− F (p))N
]
.
Comparing this with equation (2) shows that piI(p) < piE(p) = piE(p) < piI(v), so it can never be
optimal for the incumbent to set a price lower than p when λ = (1 − λ)/N . Given this result, if
the incumbent’s profit at v increases faster in λ than the profits evaluated at any other price p in
the support of F (p), we can be sure that the incumbent will find it profitable to set a price equal
to v. Therefore, we have to evaluate whether dpiI(v)/dλ > dpiI(p)/dλ, i.e.,
(v − r) [1−G(H(p))] > (p− r)
[
1−G(H(p))− 1
N + 1
∫ H(p)
H(p)
N∑
k=1
(1− F (ρ(c, F )))kg(c)dc
]
.
Note that both sides of the inequality do not depend on λ. Multiplying both sides by λ gives
(v − r)λ [1−G(H(p))] > (p− r)
[
λ [1−G(H(p))]− λ
N + 1
∫ H(p)
H(p)
N∑
k=1
(1− F (ρ(c, F )))kg(c)dc
]
,
which is equivalent to
piI(v) > piI(p)−
∫ H(p)
H(p)
N∑
k=1
(1− F (ρ(c, F )))kg(c)dc−G(H(p))(1− F (p))N .
Since we know that piI(v) > piI(p) at λ = (1 − λ)/N it has to be that dpiI(v)/dλ > dpiI(p)/dλ at
λ = (1− λ)/N . Moreover, since both derivatives are constant in λ, profits at the upper bound are
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increasing faster in λ than at any other price p, so for λ ≥ (1 − λ)/N it is always optimal for the
incumbent to set a price equal to v.
C Do the firms play mixed strategies?
A fundamental feature of our model, as with most search models, is that the firms play mixed
strategies with respect to pricing. In our case, we are able to assess whether this appears to be true
within the data. The means by which we operationalise this is to convert the bi-monthly pricing
data for the “big 6” into ranks, going from 1 to 6.19 One aspect of this where theory is unclear is
how often prices are reassessed. Given the institutional regularities in this industry, we suggest that
every two months is an appropriate period. This gives us 24 observations, across 14 GB regions.
The question we ask, for each firm, is whether the strategy it plays is concordant across the time
period and across regions. If it is not significantly concordant, then this is indicative that a mixed
strategy is being pursued. For the five firms that are incumbents, we do this with and without
their incumbent areas (since it is fairly clear that, for the most part, they charged prices at the
top of the distribution for this group. Our method of testing concordance, or its absence, is using
Kendall’s coefficient of concordance (W ).20
An illustrative tabulation of ranks is given below, using the case of British Gas’s electricity
prices; the other five are similar. Of course, British Gas is not an electricity incumbent in any
area. We can calculate W using either the columns (Is the strategy concordant, or mixed, across
the 14 regions?) or the rows (Is the strategy concordant or mixed across bimonthly time periods?).
Then, given the degrees of freedom in these cases, we compare the relevant calculated value (a
19Arguably, the rank of the firm in the set of prices is a convenient way of assessing its strategy—if a consumer is
searching amongst a subset of prices, including for some exhaustive search, then the consumer will choose the lowest,
all other things equal, whether it is significantly lower or slightly lower than other offers. In the earlier years, the
firms had not necessarily merged or consolidated pricing across divisions of the firm. Here, our procedure is to take
the lead partner value, except for the local area, in these cases. To illustrate, a clear cut case is Scottish Power,
where there was a “Manweb specific” offering in that area, whilst Scottish Power did not offer itself to serve the
region. However, in other cases, for example EdF, there were sometimes two separate offerings in the area in some
early periods.
20The literature on testing for mixed strategies in play is not very helpful in suggesting approaches. The best-known
strand of it relates to sports activities (e.g. penalty kicks in serves, behaviour in tennis serves), which is not very
relevant here. A more promising approach in the present context is adopted by Lach (2002)—this is the approach
used in Giulietti et al (2010a). What we report on above is essentially an extension of this idea, with the same results
as in that paper.
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transformation of W ) with the χ2 distribution with n− 1 degrees of freedom, n being the number
of cases. As can be seen, there is no evidence to reject the null hypothesis of mixed strategy in
either dimension. This is obvious by inspection in the case of different regions, but less obvious
in the time dimension. One thing this test does not make use of is the sequencing of time, and it
is clear that there is some time dependence in at least some regions.21 The other regions give the
same answer on the concordance test, once incumbency has been accounted for.
Our general conclusion from this analysis is that a model in which firms play mixed strategies
does not do empirical violence to the actual experience. Whether this is conscious behaviour on the
part of the firms involved or nor is unclear and we do not claim that the firms deliberately pursue
mixed strategy pricing, simply that the outcome is as if they in fact do so.
Company: BG
2002 2003 2004 2005
Region feb apr jun aug oct dec feb apr jun aug oct dec feb apr jun aug oct dec feb apr jun aug oct dec
eastern 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 6 5 4 4 4 4 6 6
emid (powergen) 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 5 3 3 3 6 5 4 4 4 4 4 4
lndn 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 3 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 5 4
meb 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 4 3 3 2 2 4 3 3 2 5 4 3 3 3 3 6 5
manwbb 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 4 4 2 2 1 5 4 3 3 3 3 5 4
nrthrn 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 5 5 5 3 5 4 4 4 4 4 6 5
nweb 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 3 5 3 4 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 6 6
seebrd 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4
shydro 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 4 2 2 2 2 2 4
scpwr 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 4 3 2 1 1 1 5 4
sthrn 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 5 3 3 3 2 4 2 2 2 6 5 4 3 3 3 6 5
swlec 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 3 3 3 2 6 5 5 4 6 6 5 4 4 4 6 6
sweb 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 3 4 3 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 4
yorks 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 6 5
Region k = 24 n = 14 critical
χ2 4.7 20
Time k = 14 n = 24
χ2 11 32
Table A-1: Ranks
21In a market like electricity, where there is continuous purchasing, we would expect to see only gradual movements
to being a better or worse buy, rather than sudden changes.
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D Advertising as a source of price information
In addition to consumers being able to glean information for themselves, from information providers
such as energywatch and online switching services, and from sales people, information (or perhaps,
invitations to obtain information) is also available via advertisements. To investigate this aspect,
we obtained information from NMR Digest for our range of years from liberalization. This is
a quarterly publication that checks all significant (non-digital) media activity. Its methodology
appears to be to scan a very wide range of print, poster, TV and radio media outlets throughout
the UK, recording the presence of advertisements and applying published rate-card information to
get a figure for spend22 (subject to a lower cut-off). Since categorization of the advertisement series
is sometimes ambiguous (for example, as to whether it applies to electricity or gas, or both), we
aggregated all relevant cases to get an annual figure per firm, with the results shown in the table
below
Average
Company 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 per year
EdF 2986 2390 2069 4827 1119 3537 1891 2688
NPOWER 4010 10944 5809 2370 583 5015 8184 5274
EON 2973 4983 10168 8580 5491 4518 8372 6441
SSE 717 162 0 236 88 92 88 198
Scottish P 4549 837 666 600 733 2419 2219 1718
BG 17868 5682 13345 10306 810 4466 5012 8213
Average 5517 4166 5343 4487 1471 3341 4294
Source: NMR Digest, various issues, after aggregation.
Table A-2: Media spend
Outside the “big 6”, there is remarkably little expenditure, right from the outset. Even within
this group, SSE seems to promote very little indeed by these means. Indeed, in total the expenditure
can be viewed as modest, less than £1 per customer per year (so maybe a half % of turnover), on
average. On a more qualitative note, given the pricing structures employed by all of these players,
it is not feasible to produce a simple comparative information advertisement. Thus the media tend
to be selective at best in quoting pricing reasons for a switch. All also claim excellent service,
22This will tend to be an overestimate, due to discounts being applied.
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in some cases a potentially dubious claim! We conclude from this investigation that this form of
promotional activity is not particularly important in the electricity industry relative to those we
investigate.
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